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In this paper I discuss very recent developments in the post-2020 climate and energy policy 
framework of the European Union as well as their implications for the German energy tran-
sition process. In a first step, I analyze how the need for the planned modifications of the 
European strategy is framed. I argue that the European Commission obviously sparked off a 
new round in tackling a longstanding governance dilemma between European market inte-
gration and regulatory diversity among Member States regarding energy and environmental 
issues. 
In a second step, I take a closer look at the implications of these changes at the European 
level for the German energy transition pathway. I argue that supranational pressure to 
adapt national energy policies to internal market rules coincides with the dominant domes-
tic framing of the need for market integration of renewable energies. This interplay of 
problem framings, on the one hand, and the discretionary power of the European Commis-
sion to control competition rules, on the other, explains the very recent instrumental shift 
in the German national support scheme for renewable energies.  
Subsequently, I debate various governance options for dealing with the implications of the 
proposed new European approach to energy and climate policy, both against the backdrop 
of the particular German way of energy transition as well as against the backdrop of gen-
eral transition challenges.  
 Contents  
1 Introduction ..............................................................................  1 
2 Europeanization of climate and energy policy ....................................  2 
2.1 The degree of vertical integration in the current climate and energy policy 
framework 2009-2020. A brief overview ..............................................  2 
2.2 Europe at a crossroad? The shaping of the post-2020 energy and climate 
policy framework through the prism of single market integration ................  4 
 The break with the three-pillar approach in the target architecture ............  5 
 Flexibility of Member States versus a strong European governance 
framework: An inherent governance dilemma within the EU ......................  7 
 Supranational pressure to force regulatory harmonization in RES support 
schemes ....................................................................................  9 
3 Implications for the German energy transition process and governance 
options for a low carbon energy system transition ............................... 14 
3.1 An unfavourable target architecture .................................................. 15 
 A possible complementarity of governance options: leadership in multi-
lateral negotiations, bilateral cooperation and horizontal processes of policy 
diffusion ................................................................................... 16 
3.2 A hasty government’s adaptation to supranational pressure: the remaining 
governance options regarding instrument choice for RES support ................ 20 
 A careful instrument design by including normative elements .................... 21 
4 Conclusion ................................................................................ 23 
 Literature ................................................................................. 25 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1:  Main findings of the impact assessment of policy options regarding 
target architecture .............................................................. 5 
Figure 2:  The inherent governance dilemma in European RES-policy and the new 




FFU-Report 03-2014: Europe and the German energy transition 1 
 
1 Introduction 
In March 2013 the European Commission (EC) started the debate on and related activities 
for the new post-2020 energy and climate policy framework. It is becoming obvious that 
the Commission envisions significant changes in the framework. On the one hand, its main 
amendments concern the abolishment of the three-pillar approach in the target architec-
ture pursued so far. On the other hand, we can observe a reinforced supranational pres-
sure for energy policy coordination, precisely to harmonize national support schemes for 
renewable energies. 
In the first section of this paper, I will analyse these modifications in the European frame-
work in detail. I will show that the planned modification in the target architecture aim at 
increasing the flexibility of Member States to deliver GHG-reduction. Seemingly contradic-
tory at first glance, however, are the Commission’s intensified efforts to finally come for-
ward with a regulatory harmonization of support schemes for renewable energies, which, 
in fact, restricts national flexibility. I will argue that both of these modifications are rec-
ommended not for their effectiveness in achieving climate or environmental objectives, 
but for their alignment with core beliefs within EU supranational institutions regarding 
cost-efficiency and internal market compatibility of targets, policies and measures. The 
need for greater energy policy coordination is viewed by the EC solely through the prism of 
single market integration. This perspective implies policy choices regarding the adequate 
policy level to act within the European multi-level-system and the appropriate policy in-
struments.  
In the next section, I will analyse the implications of these changes in the energy and cli-
mate policy framework at European level for the German energy transition pathway. In 
Germany, there has long been a tendency to limit discussions related to the energy transi-
tion to the need for greater political coordination within the German federal system. Only 
recently has the political relevance of European policies to the German energy transition 
been given much greater political attention. This has been enforced not only by the con-
spicuous signals given from actors at the European level. More significantly, the suprana-
tional pressure to adapt national policies to internal market rules coincides with the domi-
nant domestic framing of the need for market integration of renewable energies. This in-
terplay of problem framings, on the one hand, and the discretionary power of the Europe-
an Commission to control competition rules, on the other, explains the very recent instru-
mental shift in the German national support scheme for renewable energies. 
In a subsequent step, I discuss various governance options for dealing with the implications 
of the proposed new European approach to energy and climate policy, both against the 
background of the particular German way of energy transition as well as against the back-
ground of general transition challenges. As a transition process is a complex socio-technical 
change, which requires destabilizing lock-in mechanisms of the existing system, shifts in 
behavioural patterns of consumers and producers, as well as technological, political and 
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social innovations (cf. Geels 2010), I will argue for widening of the perspective from one-
dimensional market considerations to these broader challenges of a transition towards a 
low-carbon economy. In particular, I will argue that this widened perspective should in-
clude the need for new players who might challenge established patterns of actions in the 
energy field. 
In this vein, I will argue that a political approach to making decisions on one ideational 
fundament alone - that of single market functioning and macro-economic concerns of 
short-term cost-efficiency – will not be appropriate to sufficiently address these challenges 
of a sustainable energy system transition. Consequently, this paper sheds light on transna-
tionally interlinked subnational and societal activities, where a new paradigm is emerging 
for addressing these transition challenges. I will argue for strengthening the role of com-
munities, municipalities and regions in the European multi-level-system of decision-
making, as it was their specific framing of transition challenges as well as additional bene-
fits in terms of local and regional development, job creation and reliance of indigenous 
energy sources, that to a great extent motivated and legitimized respective innovative ac-
tivities and investment in renewable energy sources thus far across Europe, particularly in 
Germany.   
2 Europeanization of climate and energy policy 
2.1 The degree of vertical integration in the current climate and energy policy 
framework 2009-2020. A brief overview 
European energy and climate policy has a long history; during this process the modes of 
policy coordination developed from very loose intergovernmental coordination of de-
central member state policies to stricter forms of regulatory harmonization in selected 
policy fields (Jordan et al. 2010; Hildingsson et al. 2011; Wettestad et al. 2012, Geden und 
Fischer 2014). Alongside this development, a partial turn from an intergovernmental to a 
supranational mode of governance occurred, particularly regarding competition law within 
the European single market (e.g. McGowan and Wilks 1995). However, European policy in-
tegration is not characterized by a consistent and uniform degree of integration across pol-
icy fields. Instead, we can find substantial differences with regards to the degree to which 
Member States transfer authority to the European level. According to the literature1, there 
are at least three applicable criteria to determine the degree of vertical integration: the 
degree of legal bindingness of targets; the degree of regulatory harmonization of policies 
and measures; and the degree of EU-level institution-building (cf. Wettestad et al. 2012). 
These three criteria will be used to briefly characterize the current energy and climate 
policy framework of the European Union.  
1 For example Radaelli 2003, Börzel 2005; Schimmelpfennig and Rittberger 2006, Leuffen et al. 2013. 
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The energy and climate policy framework for 2009-2020 consists of the following core ele-
ments: the three-pillar-based energy and climate target architecture, its related policies, 
and the completion of the Single Energy Market. The degree of harmonisation of national 
policies substantially differs with respect to these policy objectives. 
In March 2007, the European Heads of State and Government agreed on the three-pillar-
approach in defining energy and climate policy targets. By 2020 greenhouse gas emissions 
should be reduced by 20 %, the share of renewable energy in gross final consumption must 
increase to 20%, and energy efficiency should be improved by 20%. While the Member 
States have agreed on a legally binding character for the first two targets, the energy effi-
ciency target is only indicative. With these targets, the European Union has a reputation as 
a pioneer in climate protection worldwide.  
After tough negotiations between the Member States, a comprehensive energy and climate 
policy package for the period up to 2020 was adopted in 2009. 
The European Emission Trading System (ETS) - the flagship of the European climate strate-
gy to achieve the GHG-reduction target – became more functional with an agreement on a 
high degree of regulatory harmonisation of allocation methods. To the end of achieving the 
renewable energy target, the Renewable Energy Directive was adopted. The Directive pro-
vides that each Member State must achieve a certain percentage of energy from renewable 
sources by 2020. However, Member States have significant national discretion over the 
means and policies employed to meet these targets. Thus, due to the very diverse national 
interests and preferences, as well as diverse path-dependencies in the organization of na-
tional energy systems in terms of administrative structures and regulatory patterns, policy 
styles, Member States agreed on a low level of regulatory harmonization regarding support 
schemes for renewables. 
With respect to the policies and measures put in place to achieve the efficiency target, the 
degree of regulatory harmonization varies. For instance, we find a rather high degree of 
regulatory harmonization for product-related measures (e.g. ECO-Design-directive, Di-
rective on energy labeling) according to single market logics. There is a distinct regulatory 
picture of those efficiency policies, which are not directly linked to the free movement of 
goods and services. The European Energy Efficiency Directive, adopted in 2012, includes – 
among other objectives - an indicative national target for Member States and a provision 
that each member state shall introduce an energy efficiency obligation scheme2. However, 
Member States may opt out of introducing such a scheme and may alternatively choose 
2  Energy efficiency obligations are mandatory energy targets for energy companies to be delivered through 
end-use energy efficiency measures. For an excellent overview and comparison of practical examples of en-
ergy obligation schemes in Europe, please see Steuwer 2013. 
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other measures to fulfil the saving target3. Thus, Member States did not agree to fully 
harmonize policies for achieving energy efficiency targets.  
The other core element of the 2009 energy and climate policy package is energy market 
integration. The integrated EU energy market, a core concern the European Commission 
has pursued since the late 1980s, should ensure the achievement of the aforementioned 
targets in a cost-efficient way through the free and cross-border transfer and trading of 
gas and electricity. Thus, related policies aim at the coupling of energy markets across Eu-
rope and at dismantling diverse restrictions and physical barriers to cross-border exchange 
and trading. During negotiations on the adoption of the third internal energy market pack-
age in 2009, the Member States did not, however, agree on any substantial transfer of na-
tional authority to the EU level. In particular, the Member States disagreed on a unified 
model of unbundling of energy utilities - as was preferred by the European Commission 
(EC) - due to different national and historically developed regulatory structures and tradi-
tions in organizing national energy systems. Some moderate Europeanization effects can be 
observed in terms of the integration of national transmission systems. New supranational 
institutions (ENTSO-E, ENSO-G, ACER)4 were established and equipped with moderate deci-
sion-making powers in order to reduce institutional barriers to cross-border grid-bound en-
ergy flows. These institutions replaced the previously voluntary coordination between na-
tional regulatory authorities and network operators (Wettestad et al. 2012).  
2.2 Europe at a crossroad? The shaping of the post-2020 energy and climate policy 
framework through the prism of single market integration 
In March 2013 the European Commission (EC) began a discourse on the new energy and 
climate policy package for the time after 2020 with its Green Paper “A 2030 framework for 
climate and energy policies” (European Commission 2013a)5. From the very beginning it 
was clear that the Commission envisioned significant changes in the framework. Relevant 
modifications relate to the target architecture, and also to a reinforced supranational 
pressure to harmonize national RES-support schemes. In the following, I will argue that 
these alterations are recommended by the EC not for effectiveness reasons, but because of 
core beliefs within EU supranational institutions regarding cost-efficiency and market com-
3  For a further discussion on the implementation of the European Energy Efficiency Directive see Steuwer 
2014. 
4  ENTSO-E/G = European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity/Gas. The ENTSOs propose 
and coordinate the definition of principles and procedures regarding the conditions for access to the net-
work for cross border exchanges of electricity and gas. ACER = Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regu-
lators coordinates regional and cross-regional initiatives which favour market integration. It monitors the 
work of ENTSOs and their EU-wide network development plans and the functioning of gas and electricity 
markets in general, in particular wholesale energy trading. 
5  The European Commission is the institutional actor, which has the right and the mandate to develop the 
proposal on the new framework to the Council and the parliament, which will ultimately decide and adopt 
the new framework in October 2014. 
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patibility. This underlying framing of the problem implies certain policy choices regarding 
the adequate policy level to act on within the multi-level-EU-system and policy instru-
ments (cf. Hildingsson et al. 2011). 
The break with the three-pillar approach in the target architecture 
The Commission’s Green Paper situated the question of the types, nature and levels of tar-
gets and their interactions at the centre of the consultation process. Due to diverging 
views among Member States and stakeholders on the character of these interactions – rang-
ing from mutual support to trade-off – the Commission suggests the necessity of checking 
“whether new targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency would be necessary to 
deliver further progress in the 2030 perspective” and “[…] whether having only a GHG 
emissions target for 2030 would be appropriate, taking into account other objectives such 
as security of supply and competitiveness.”(European Commission 2013a: 7)  
Parallel to the public consultation process, the commission’s working staff has conducted a 
comprehensive impact assessment (IA) to assess the different policy options regarding tar-
get architecture and levels of targets in order to back the final decision of the EC with its 
findings (European Commission 2014a). 
Figure 1: Main findings of the impact assessment of policy options regarding target architecture  
 
Source: Own illustration based on European Commission 2014a. 
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Regarding the question as to whether to have only one GHG-Target or to proceed with the 
three-pillar-approach, the commission’s working staff’s impact assessment found higher 
additional benefits in the case of a three-pillar-approach on the one hand, but equally per-
ceived the risk for Member States to continue with other low-carbon energy sources and 
technologies incentivised by the ETS, like nuclear power or carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) on the other. “A single GHG target would in principle treat options for GHG reduc-
tions in a non-discriminatory and technology neutral way. However, higher efforts geared 
towards energy efficiency and renewable energy beyond what is needed to achieve a GHG 
target would result in higher benefits relating to e.g., improvements in fuel efficiency, se-
curity of supply, reduction of the negative trade balance for fossil fuels, environmental 
impacts and health. A single GHG target is also expected to result in lower GDP and em-
ployment compared to a framework based on more ambitious targets for also renewables 
and energy efficiency, while macro-economic benefits associated with the recycling of 
auctioning revenues into lower labour costs would increase“(ibid: 15). Furthermore, it was 
calculated that in the short or medium term the overall system cost increase would be 
higher in the case of a triple target architecture, due to higher up-front investments in ef-
ficiency and renewable energy sources. These costs, however, will pay off - but only in the 
medium or long run (ibid: 16; see Figure 1). Thus, the impact assessment did not result in 
clear recommendations. Instead of arguing for a single-target solution, it emphasized vari-
ous benefits of a three-pillar-approach. Nevertheless, the final decision of the EC, which 
was formalized in its communication to the council and the parliament, is based on a very 
selective perception of the balanced and sophisticated work done by its own staff and only 
emphasizes the short-term cost increase of the three-pillar approach. The Commission In 
January 2014 finally concluded that one binding GHG target only ”[...] represents the least 
cost pathway to a low carbon economy which of itself should drive an increased share of 
renewable energy and energy savings in the Union.“ (European Commission 2014b: 5)6.  
The Commission additionally justified the one-binding-target-only approach with the higher 
flexibility of Member States to achieve CO2-reductions with the non-discriminatory and 
technology-neutral nature of such a single target. Regarding the additional benefits of the 
three-pillar-approach, which were emphasised in the Commission’s staff impact assess-
ment and in many of the stakeholder statements in the public consultation process of the 
Green Paper, the EC qualifies their importance with the following arguments: “Experience 
with the current 2020 framework indicates that while European and national targets can 
drive strong action by the Member States and growth in emerging industries they have not 
6  For RES the EC proposes a headline indicative target of a 27 % share in final energy consumption by 2030, a 
target which is of non-binding nature for Member States. A precise number for the recommended ambition 
regarding energy efficiency was only delivered in July 2014 and completes the EC proposal of the future 
climate and energy policy framework up to 2030: the EC suggests in its Energy Efficiency Communication a 
headline indicative target of increasing energy efficiency by 30% by 2030 (European Commission 2014c). 
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always ensured market integration, cost-efficiency and undistorted competi-
tion.”(European Commission 2014b: 5, author’s emphasis). 
The increased flexibility of Member States, however, to deliver GHG-reduction, at first 
sight seem to be contradictory to the Commission’s intensified efforts to finally come for-
ward with a regulatory harmonization of support schemes for renewable energies, which, 
in fact, restricts national flexibility.  
Flexibility of Member States versus a strong European governance framework: An in-
herent governance dilemma within the EU 
From the European Commission's perspective, there is no antagonism between its notion of 
flexibility regarding the choice of low-carbon energy sources to achieve the GHG objec-
tives and the need for a “strong European governance framework accompanying the single 
target” (ibid: 6) – precisely, the reduction of national flexibility regarding instrument 
choices for RES support schemes. Instead, the Commission argues that the strong European 
governance framework accompanying the single target should aim at delivering “[...] EU 
objectives for renewable energy and energy savings in a manner that is consistent with at-
tainment of national and European greenhouse gas targets and coherent with the wider 
principles of European energy policy: the operation and further integration of the internal 
energy market and the delivery of a competitive, secure and sustainable energy sys-
tem” (ibid: 6, author’s emphasis). 
This statement reveals the main rationale and the problem framing of the need for energy 
policy co-ordination by the EC: it is an internal market concern, instead of a concern about 
the promotion of innovative approaches to prevent climate change. However, looking at 
the need for energy policy coordination solely through the prism of market integration 
(cf. Hildingsson et al. 2011) places any national policy provision to support nationally de-
sired developments under suspicion that it will create serious market distortions. This per-
spective on the need for strong European governance comes into conflict with another 
governance mechanism in multi-level-systems, which is described in the literature: regula-
tory competition to bring about innovative policy solutions. The term regulatory competi-
tion relates to the dynamic in multi-level system to bring about and politically compete 
with policy innovations. The de-central level is assumed to be an appropriate level in 
which to develop and experiment with policy innovations (“laboratories of innovation”), 
which may later – whether as a result of competitive dynamics between the jurisdictions or 
as a result of policy learning - diffuse horizontally or vertically (e.g. Oates 1998, Heritier 
et al. 1996, Kern 2000, Holzinger and Knill 2004, Tews 2005). 
Thus, if the Community wants to promote regulatory competition and a substantial “race 
to the top”, it must allow for substantially greater regulatory diversity. However, regulato-
ry diversity, in turn, will automatically lead to distortions in the free movement of goods 
and thus infringe one of the founding principles of the Union (cf. Dalhammar 2007). 
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This is an inherent governance dilemma that the EU has faced from of its initial pro-
nouncement of market integration as the driving principle of European integration. It has 
also been an issue of longstanding political and scientific debates on the interrelation be-
tween single market and environmental policy (e.g. Scharpf 1996, Weale et al. 2000, 
Macrory 2006, Jordan et al. 2010). Legal and political scientists have revealed both syner-
gies within this interrelation, but equally inevitable tensions between the functioning of 
the single market and the implementation of environmental policy7. Compatibility suffers 
from the multitude of contradictory rules and principles regarding both targets in EU trea-
ty provisions, which are not ranked. There is more a “living together” of contradictory tar-
gets, rules and principles (Torre-Schaub 2006). Consequently, divergences arise especially 
around the question of how much discretion should be left to the Member States to devel-
op national policy approaches, which might come into conflict with single market rules. 
Clarification about a prioritization can often only by delivered by case law decisions of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)8.  
Different types of policy coordination regarding market integration and environmental pol-
icy have been described as consequences of different interest constellations among Mem-
ber States (e.g. Scharpf 1996). Market integration within the EU is a politically driven pro-
cess of eliminating trade and investment barriers, as well as competition distortions, be-
tween the members of the EU. It is a process of integration through the replacement of 
differing national legal provisions concerning these issues with harmonized European legal 
provisions. Environmental protection within the EU – although equally a field of European 
action with a legal mandate since the adoption of the European Single Act in 1986 – can re-
ly significantly less on this type of full regulatory harmonization. Only with regard to envi-
ronmental standards, which directly affect single market requirements, is a similar type of 
full harmonization observable (product norms). Thus, regarding environmental standards, 
national legal provisions are not usually fully replaced by European rules. The desired lev-
els of standards and the choices of instruments are nationally defined according to hetero-
geneous national preferences, path dependencies and regulatory patterns (e.g. Knill 1998, 
Börzel 1999).  
Thus, a full harmonization comparable with single market provisions is hard to achieve. It 
is furthermore not desirable, as it would hinder regulatory competition between jurisdic-
7  For a legal literature review concerning the tensions between single market and environmental provisions in 
the EU see Tews and Vagt 2010. 
8  Although the Court has added substantially to the Treaty provisions and has strengthened the role environ-
mental considerations the case-by-case nature of the Court’s solutions has also demonstrated the limits of 
such an approach. Scientists have pointed at the risk of a “regulatory chill”, precisely the danger of a lack 
of regulatory action in the Member states. Afraid from eventually being overruled, Member States might re-
frain from taking ambitious action and instead wait for the supra-national actor to take decisions. While it 
appears from a number of different cases that the Court is ready to accept national derogations on grounds 
of stricter environmental standards, Member States seem to be rather cautious in actively “challenging” the 
Commission (Tews and Vagt 2010: 60). 
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tions, which spurs adaptive policy innovations and subsequent horizontal learning process-
es.  
Primary as well as secondary EU law left significant discretion to Member States on envi-
ronmental and, since the Lisbon Treaty, energy matters. Under these conditions, however, 
national provisions often come into conflict with basic single market rules. Therefore, the 
likely conflict of interests between environmental protection and the European single mar-
ket has been manifested in the legal provisions of the European Union since environmental 
concerns were first the subject of community law in 1986 (Torre-Schaub 2006:12 pp.; Pagh 
2006:3). Moreover, this tension has not been fully resolved by any of the amendments of 
the EU’s Treaty provisions. Instead, with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, energy 
policy - as a traditionally national competence - was defined as a subject of community ac-
tivities. Consequently, the previously described tension was extended to energy issues9.  
Supranational pressure to force regulatory harmonization in RES support schemes 
The long lasting struggle in the EU over RES support schemes is a very suitable example of 
this inherent governance dilemma. The European Commission has repeatedly made at-
tempts to harmonize national support schemes on renewable energies and to promote a 
specific instrument as the most market compatible (cf. Busch 2005, Lauber 2011, Jacobs 
2012). The rationale for regulatory harmonization is based on the neo-liberal perception 
that regulatory diversity conflicts with basic provisions of single market integration and 
leads to market distortions. Quota systems with tradable certificates were the first pre-
ferred instrument choice of the EC, as quota systems were perceived as the adequate in-
strument choice in an integrated energy market. As early as 1998, the EC saw no alterna-
tive to an instrumental shift and regulatory harmonization: "the move from a fixed tariff 
approach towards one based on trade and competition is at some stage inevitable" (Euro-
pean Commission 1998: 17; quoted in Busch 2005: 241). However, this volume-based eco-
nomic instrument was not preferred among the majority of European countries. Instead, 
price-based feed-in-tariff-systems diffused among Member States (Bechberger et al. 2003, 
Tews et al. 2003, Busch 2005), especially due to their effectiveness. Current surveys indi-
cate that there is a growing trend towards European convergence of national support 
schemes based on price-based economic instruments, such as guaranteed feed-in tariffs 
followed by guaranteed market premiums - which some scholars characterize as sub-
categories of feed-in-tariffs (Kitzing et al. 2012; Jacobs 2012, ecofys 2014.).  
The most ostensibly market compatible quantity-based quota-system did not perform well 
in practice, as a recent study on design matters of RES-support schemes in an integrated 
energy market reveals. “Empirical evidence concerning quota system shows that the theo-
9  For a related critical discussion on the normative desirability for and the legal and political feasibility of an 
Europeanization of energy policies of Member States see Strunz et al. 2014a.  
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retical advantages of quota systems could not be realized in practice. The recent substitu-
tion of quota obligations with other support mechanisms in three large countries – UK, Ita-
ly, and Poland – suggests a trend moving away from using quota obligations in Europe” 
(ecofys 2014: 81).  
So far, Member States have been able to fend off the supranational pressure for harmo-
nized RES-support-schemes. They may do so by referring to constitutional provisions of the 
EU primary law which defines the “[…] Member State's right to determine the conditions 
for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply […] (Art. 194 TFEU) as well as by referring to EU sec-
ondary legislation, specifically the RES-Directive (2009/28/28/28/EG), which provides na-
tional discretion over the means and policies for achieving mandatory national RES-targets.  
Figure 2:  The inherent governance dilemma in European RES-policy and the new attempt to 
define adequate policy levels and instrument choices   
  
Source: Own illustration 
As is the nature of a dilemma, the problem is inherent and thus persistent: It is an equally 
constitutional provision of EU primary law that enables the EC to renew its attempts to 
harmonize national RES-support schemes using the lever of the competition law (see Figure 
2). Concerning single market integration, Member States have transferred national authori-
ty to the supranational level to control and sanction compliance with single market rules. 
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Thus, the EC has the discretionary power to decide whether to commence an infringement 
procedure against competition rules and to refer a case to the European Court of Justice.  
It is becoming apparent that the European Commission's efforts to bring about regulatory 
harmonization have intensified since the end of 2013. These efforts include the revision of 
the state aid guidelines, as well as the opening of infringement procedures against national 
support schemes – in particular, against the German scheme.  In December 2013, the 
Commission submitted a new draft of its guidelines on environmental and energy state aid. 
The Commission’s state aid guidelines, simply speaking, define exemptions to the general 
prohibition of state aid in the internal market and define specific justifications for state 
aid which supersede competition rules. Since the introduction of the European Single Act 
in 1986 they have been an effective means for the EC to extend its own scope for action 
against Member States. As a kind of European "soft law" – these guidelines are not directly 
binding for the Member States. However, due to their binding effects for the Commission’s 
decisions on the state-aid rules conformity of national provisions, they have a meaningful 
law-shaping effect on the national policies of Member States (see Hartlapp and Bauer 
2011). These new guidelines on state environmental and energy aid contain provisions 
which seriously interfere with Member States’ national authority to shape support schemes 
for RES. 
The draft of the new guidelines on environmental and energy state aid published in De-
cember 2013 entailed a provision concerning the design of national support schemes for 
RES, which will be considered compatible with the Commission’s perception of a propor-
tionate state aid which does not distort competition to an extent contrary to the internal 
market.  
The draft defined feed-in-tariffs as a non-market compatible instrument. State aid for 
electricity from renewable energy sources will only be considered compatible with the in-
ternal market if the aid is granted as a premium in addition to the market price; the level 
of granted aid has to be determined by a technology-neutral, competitive bidding process. 
Furthermore, the Commission drafted an additional requirement that Member States have 
to open their national support schemes for renewable electricity generated in other coun-
tries10. 
10  Concerning the latter, the then pending ECJ-case of the Finnish Ålands Vindkraft AB against the Swedish 
support scheme for renewable energies is relevant. According to the opinion of the advocate general Yves 
Bot, the case “presents the Court with a fresh opportunity to rule on the consistency with EU law of nation-
al support schemes for energies produced from renewable sources under which the support is reserved to 
electricity producers located on the national territory” (Case C-573/12, opinion). The Finnish producer 
Ålands Vindkraft appealed to the Swedish courts on the grounds that the Swedish support scheme violated 
core “free movement of goods” principles and, specifically, the provisions of Article 34 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to the extent that only producers of renewable energy located in Swe-
den could benefit and imported renewables were otherwise excluded or discriminated against. In December 
2012, the Swedish higher courts referred the matter to the ECJ. In January 2014 the final opinion of the ad-
vocate general was published, which was in line with the drafted European Commission’s state aid require-
ment to open national schemes to producers from outside. According to Bot’s conclusions, a scheme re-
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After a process of public consultation, the new guidelines were adopted in April 2014. Due 
to the substantial number of critical comments and negotiations with Member States, who 
insisted on more flexibility in the financing schemes, some slight corrections have been 
made. First, the adopted guidelines now consider the different stages of technological de-
velopment of renewable energy technologies and allow technology-specific auctions. Sec-
ond, the required opening of national support schemes to foreign producers was slightly 
softened, due to the pending cases in front of the Court of Justice concerning the issue 
(see footnote 10): “Operating aid schemes should in principle be open to other EEA coun-
tries and Contracting Parties of the Energy Community to limit the overall distortive ef-
fects” (European Commission 2014d; author’s emphasis). Third, although the Commission 
maintains its preference for market premiums to be determined through competitive bid-
ding processes, the guidelines now contain a provision for a so-called opt-out-option from 
the tender mechanism, if: 
• “Member States demonstrate that only one or a very limited number of projects or 
sites could be eligible; or 
• Member States demonstrate that a competitive bidding process would lead to high-
er support levels (for example to avoid strategic bidding); or 
• Member States demonstrate that a competitive bidding process would result in low 
project realisation rates (avoid underbidding)” (ibid.). 
If Member States can provide evidence for these opt-out criteria, then aid must be granted 
as a market premium instead of fixed feed-in tariffs. However, this cannot occur in the 
case of negative market prices. The mandatory direct marketing and market premiums 
have to be introduced by 2015 for generation facilities over 500 kW (3 MW wind). If Mem-
ber States do not provide the evidence for opting-out, than by 2017 any other support 
scheme for RES-electricity will be presumed to be unjustified state aid and the Member 
State will risk the opening of an infringement proceeding by the European Commission. 
Legal analysts confirm the political assessment that, with the provision of such detailed 
specifications in their guidelines, the Commission is using the competition law to shape 
energy policy and is thus seriously intervening in the constitutionally defined rights of 
Member States. “The EU state aid law is not a priority ‘meta-law’ that per se overrules 
other EU jurisdictions. Consequently, EU state aid law does not automatically break EU en-
stricting access to its support for electricity generated at the national territory is not compatible with basic 
provisions of single market regulation and therefore invalid. However, The ECJ on 1st July delivered - 
against any expectation – a landmark decision which deems the Swedish green certificates scheme in con-
formity with EU law. It confirms that, based on the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC and the Trea-
ties, national governments can continue restricting access to their support schemes for renewable electrici-
ty generated on their territory. 
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ergy law. […] Some of the criteria of the state aid guidelines violate the provisions regard-
ing the energy policy competence level as defined under Article 194 TFEU and the Renew-
able Energy Directive 2009/28/EC” (CEP 2014: 2; author’s translation into English).  
In parallel with the publication of the draft guidelines, the Commission opened a state aid 
infringement procedure against Germany in December of 2013. In order to understand the 
relevance of this infringement procedure within the struggle over support schemes, it is 
important to note that the German FIT-scheme has been recognized by many scholars and 
practitioners as a role model for subsequent national adoptions of similar FIT/FIP-based 
support schemes in a several other European countries.  
Although the state-aid conformity of the exemptions granted for German electricity-
intensive companies regarding the renewable energy surcharge has ostensibly been the 
subject of the procedure, there is some evidence that suggests the opening has been moti-
vated instead by a desire to establish an additional lever to further substantiate the Com-
mission’s demand for harmonized support schemes in its preferred direction.  
The Federal Energy Minister Gabriel assessed the opening of the proceedings as a "detour 
via competition law to have access to an area where the Commission actually has no juris-
diction" (quoted in photon 09/01/2014; author’s translation into English). German econo-
mists and lawyers, including the President of the Federal Network Agency, had earlier sig-
nalled that the pending infringement proceedings will unlikely have a dramatic impact on 
the German economy, as the adaptation requirements would be more about marginal dele-
tions of privileges (quoted in FAZ, 11.01.2014, p.14). Consequently, the results of the ne-
gotiations between Minister Gabriel and Competition Commissioner Almunia have shown 
that the dispute over exemptions was more about the compatibility of the respective legal 
provisions to grant exemption than about the sheer size of “subsidies”/exemption grant-
ed11.  
What becomes important in this proceeding is a side effect: a pending infringement pro-
ceeding can create immense pressure for national action. In particular, the Commission’s 
decision to initiate an infringement procedure results in the so-called Standstill require-
ment (Article 88, TFEU), which is precisely the immediate suspension of the controversial 
national provision. In the case of the opening of the infringement procedure against Ger-
many, the EC’s decision suspended further grants of multi-billion EUR exemptions to Ger-
man energy intensive companies until a final clarification of the case or a timely amend-
ment of the national legal provision (The Renewable Energy Act), with prior notification 
and approval by the European Commission, is made. It seems obvious that the Commission 
11  An analysis of the FÖS (Green Budget Reform Germany) shows that almost 90% of industrial sectors will be 
granted for exemptions according to the revised Renewable Energy Act, which base on the negotiations 
with Almunia. Thus, the federal government exhausted the maximum scope permitted by the European 
Commission (FÖS 2014). 
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did not really intend to curtail advantages for German industry, as the main engine of the 
European economic development, in such an extreme manner. Instead it is (mis)using its 
discretionary power in competition matters as a compulsive lever to enforce regulatory 
harmonization of national support schemes for renewable energy, according to its percep-
tions of market compatibility and cost-efficiency. 
3 Implications for the German energy transition process and govern-
ance options for a low carbon energy system transition 
In this section I will analyse the implications of the discussed changes in the European en-
ergy and climate policy framework for the German energy transition process. Furthermore, 
the section will combine this analysis with a discussion of the respective governance op-
tions for dealing with these consequences - both against the background of the special 
German path to energy system transition as well as against the general background of the 
challenges of a transition process towards a low carbon energy system.  
The German approach to energy transition is based on four main pillars: nuclear phase out, 
an expansion of renewable energy sources, an increase in energy efficiency and the reduc-
tion of GHG-emissions. Rapid success in the use of renewable sources has been mainly 
driven by a (previous) policy framework, which has attracted investments from a variety of 
actors, especially private consumers, communities and energy cooperatives (e.g. 
trend:research and Leuphana Universität 2013). Meanwhile, the market diffusion of renew-
able energy technologies for generating electricity has reached a new stage, where the 
need for policy-coordination between distinct levels of jurisdiction has become obvious 
(Ohlhorst et al. 2013). However, for a long time there has been a tendency to limit discus-
sions, particularly on contested distributional issues, to domestic matters, such as a Ger-
man electricity market design, and the need for greater political coordination between the 
jurisdictions within the German federal system. Only recently has the political relevance of 
European policies for the German energy transition been given much higher political atten-
tion – enforced, of course, by the conspicuous signals given by actors at the European lev-
el.  
For some time there have been diverse voices in the German debate which have pointed to 
the shortcomings of a purely national perspective on the coordination requirements. How-
ever, they argue from very different perspectives. Despite some commonalities regarding 
the rising tensions between Germany and Europe and the induced adaptation pressure on 
the German policy of energy transition, the policy suggestions regarding the required adap-
tion strategies substantially differ. One discourse coalition argues that Germany’s decision 
to follow its own path in energy system transformation threatens the EU’s efforts to 
achieve a cost-efficient transformation of energy supplies within the European energy 
market. Following this logic, Germany must modify its plans and respective instruments to 
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fit with the expectations of the European energy market (e.g. Böckers et al. 2013, Hübner 
et al. 2012, Haucap and Kühling 2013)12. 
Another coalition expresses concerns that EU-level politics pressuring Germany to modify 
its ambitious approach to transforming its energy system. This position is grounded in the 
perception of the German path for energy transition as a potential role model, which, giv-
en that it provides evidence for feasibility, might motivate other countries to follow. As a 
consequence, they call for an “Europeanization of the German energy-transition-politics” 
(Fischer and Geden 2011, Geden and Fischer 2014) or even to “globalise the German ener-
gy transition” (Westphal 2012). In this vein, scholars argue that Germany should initiate 
European energy transition politics that would accompany the German energy transition. 
The following paragraphs will show, however, that the German government has so far 
failed to transfer basic ideas from the German de-carbonisation pathway to the European 
level and to initiate favourable European-level framework conditions.  
3.1  An unfavourable target architecture  
According to many stakeholders and scholars, a GHG target alone, with the EU-ETS as the 
lead-instrument of climate protection, will never set enough incentives to invest in diverse 
renewable energy sources and in energy efficiency, as per the suggestions in the Commis-
sion’s final proposal to the council.13 Instead, it will lead to a strengthening of those energy 
actors which operate according to the logics and structures of the traditional configuration 
of electricity production (based on large centralized nuclear and fossil fuel power-plants), 
while the latter gain ground in climate change issues by the promotion of CCS. 
The implied neutrality regarding the choice of low-carbon technologies in the proposed 
single target architecture clearly conflicts with the German approach to the energy transi-
tion. According to the recommendations of the Ethics Commission and important policy 
course decisions by the German Bundestag, the pathway to a low-carbon energy system 
should be based on the aforementioned trademarks: nuclear phase-out, an increase of RES 
in the energy mix and increased energy efficiency (cf. Schreurs 2013). Additionally, the use 
12  For a critical discussion of these positions please see Strunz et al. 2014b.  
13  Concerning the shortcomings of a single price signal given by the EU-ETS to address the existing barriers for 
the development of the energy technology mix, which is needed for energy system transformation, see Mat-
thes 2010; Hey 2012, Lehmann und Gawel 2013. For a sophisticated discussion of the need for policy mixes 
from an economic theory perspective, please see Rave et al. 2013: 120 pp. 
 Furthermore, one can consider the Commission’s staff’s impact assessment (EC 2014a), which modelled the 
different target options. It reveals that the results of the single target scenario, which backed the Commis-
sions final decision to propose the single target approach, are based on the assumption of a carbon price of 
€ 40 per tonne! Compared to the current price of around € 5 a tonne and the strong opposition of business 
lobbies to any attempts to raise this price, it is quite plausible to question this figure: “Where is the politi-
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of other low-carbon technology options to meet climate change objectives, in particular 
carbon-capture and storage (CCS) is not intended, according to the (still valid) conclusions 
of the respective German policy discourses. Thus, the avenue Germany wants to take to 
transform its energy system is not characterized by treating options for GHG reductions in 
a non-discriminatory and technology-neutral way. Instead, it discriminates between want-
ed and unwanted low-carbon-technologies - due to the respective public attitudes towards 
energy technologies and the policy-makers’ responsiveness to those attitudes. Germany 
further discriminates with regard to the maturity of wanted technologies – by technology 
specific feed-in-tariffs or premiums. 
The Germans’ ambitious approach is a sharp contrast to the majority of national energy 
strategies of other Member States, which follow their own preferences according to their 
energy mixes, their historically developed domestic energy system structures and their 
path dependencies. However, in an integrated energy market, one cannot politically re-
strict the cross-border trade and exchange of electricity produced by unwanted technolo-
gies; electricity is traded in the market as a homogeneous good and its competitiveness is 
almost fully determined by its price in the market.  
A possible complementarity of governance options: leadership in multi-lateral negotia-
tions, bilateral cooperation and horizontal processes of policy diffusion  
Thus, to maintain the credibility of its own climate protection ambitions, to maintain do-
mestic public support for an energy transition based on renewables and, most probably, to 
maintain competitiveness, the German government must prevent any development which 
improves the European framework conditions for the use of nuclear energy and pronounce 
the prominent role of renewables in transforming the European electricity/energy system 
(Geden and Fischer 2014). The latter is not only relevant to ensure minimum incentives, 
given that other Member States will try to expand their renewable shares, but also against 
the background of the previously described struggle over state aid compatibility of national 
support schemes for RES. As Geden and Fischer argue “Even a weak target for RES at the 
European level would imply a prioritized role of renewables compared to that of conven-
tional fuels. This would help in controversies between the Commission and Member States 
over the single market compatibility of national support schemes” (ibid: 20; author’s trans-
lation). Precisely, it would influence respective case-law-decisions of the ECJ in the future 
(see the discussion above). 
In sum, the following strategic options to bolster the German energy transition can be 
identified and will be described in the next paragraphs: 
 Leadership at intergovernmental level 
 Co-ordination at bilateral level 
 Assisting transnational activities at subnational level.  
Taking a leadership position in the European negotiation on future energy and climate pol-
icy framework would require a more pro-active role of the German government at the Eu-
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ropean level to influence final outcomes for the framework, which will be adopted at the 
Council meeting in October 2014. The assumption of this leadership role was urged in an 
open letter from European NGOs outside of Germany to Chancellor Merkel in February 
2014: “It is time for Germany to start leading again! We urge you to step up and make 
Germany the EU leader we need on climate and energy policy”(open letter of European 
NGOs outside Germany to Chancellor Merkel, February 2014). Germany’s leadership would 
imply a consequent positioning in favour of the triple target architecture. The German 
government then would be required to advocate, first, for an ambitious target for GHG-
emissions combined with an enhanced European ETS, whose current crisis seriously coun-
teracts the increasing share of renewables in the German electricity consumption, and 
second, for a binding renewable energy target, particularly for the electricity sector. In 
that sense, the German government started several initiatives in 2014 with counterparts of 
other Member States, in which they defined their joint position in favour of a triple target 
architecture. However, regarding the RES-target, the message is not as clear as it initially 
seems, as the government calls for an ambitious European “binding” target, but the degree 
of bindingness for Member States remains somewhat blurred14. 
Given the restricted political opportunities to reach a consensus during the multilateral 
negotiations to proceed with the previous European approach in energy and climate policy, 
it would be favorable to create front-runner alliances among governments of willing Mem-
ber States, e.g. Denmark, Austria or even France15 and to enhance efforts for bilateral co-
operation even with countries, which so far perform as blocking force at the intergovern-
mental European level – as for example the Visegrád Group.  
Such bilateral cooperation might also utilize the potential of a third governance option to 
come forward with a sustainable energy system transition, one which is often overlooked 
in the debate on the diverging positions of Member States: A possible and potentially com-
plementary pathway for Europeanization beyond vertical integration through negotiated 
agreements at an intergovernmental level is a horizontal process of diffusion of problem 
14  For example, in a joint declaration of the German-French Council of Ministers in February 2014 on Energy, 
climate and sustainable development, both governments called for a binding target for RES at 30 %. Howev-
er, the declaration also provides that Member States should have the flexibility to set domestic targets, ac-
cording to their opportunities. http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/E/gemeinsame-erklaerung-deu-
fra-energie-klima,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf). Thus, it is questionable 
whether the German government wants to actively promote the approach used in the current RES-Directive, 
which obliges Member States to achieve a certain percentage of energy from renewable sources by 2020 
and only makes flexible the means to achieve these targets.  
15  Concerning France’s motivation to engage in ambitious EU climate protection targets and measures, even in 
the field of RES and energy efficiency please see, Fischer and Geden 2014. They argue that France, as the 
host of the next UNFCCC-meeting in Paris in November 2015 (which will to attempt to establish consensus 
on a post-2020 global climate change framework) has an interest in a success of the COP 21. Success will be 
only possible when the EU will convincingly demonstrate that it has not lost ambition within its own energy 
and climate policy (ibid.: 18). 
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framings, attitudes, ideas, and even policies through transnational actor networks (Tews 
and Jänicke 2005, Tews 2006, Hakelberg 2014, see also footnote 17).  
When considering only government positions it is easy to overlook what happens at subna-
tional level, especially in countries that are often portrayed as being reluctant to accept 
ambitious climate objectives. Surveys indicate that across Europe the public attitudes to-
ward preferred energy technologies clearly correspond with the German path for energy 
transition (e.g. EC 2013). A majority of European citizens prefer RES and energy efficient 
technologies over nuclear power, fossil fuels, CCS and shale gas. In all 27 countries, RES is 
the most highly mentioned priority for energy options in the next 30 years. Respondents 
living in EU15 countries are more likely to mention RES than those living in the 12 new 
Member States (74% vs. 57%) (ibid: 100 pp)16. However, this attitude in Eastern European 
countries seems to have changed recently – particularly in reaction to the Ukraine crisis 
and the increasingly relevant issue of energy dependency on Russian gas imports. A recent 
public opinion poll on behalf of Greenpeace International in Poland, Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Slovakia (Visegrád countries) revealed that now 86% of the respondents in these 
four countries support EU-binding targets for RES. RES-development and increased energy 
efficiency are perceived by three quarters of respondents as a way of remedying import 
dependency (EURActiv 18.06. 2014). 
At the subnational level we find many initiatives, not only individual grassroots projects, 
but also initiatives driven by local and regional authorities, which aim to accelerate energy 
transition. In Poland, for example, municipalities and local level administration show much 
greater support for a transition based on renewable energy sources then the Polish gov-
ernment does, as they perceive RES-deployment as a chance to combine climate protec-
tion efforts with additional benefits for their community’s development (Ancygier and 
Sulecki 2013, 2014). Twenty eight Polish cities have already adopted ambitious sustainable 
energy action plans, based on the initiatives of the Covenant of the Mayors; more than 
800 municipalities wish to develop low-carbon energy plans (Michniowksi 2014). Thus, 
there is great political potential for co-operation with regards to renewable energy pro-
jects at the subnational/local level.  
There are several other transnational networks beyond the well-known “Covenant of the 
Mayors” engaging in lesson-transfer and -drawing activities for approaching a decentralized 
energy transition (Bulkeley and Kern 2009, Hakelberg 291417). The European association of 
16  Renewable energy sources are most mentioned by respondents in Portugal (82%), Austria, Spain, German 
and Denmark (all 81%). In fact in only two countries are they mentioned by fewer than half of all respond-
ents – Bulgaria (45%) and Romania (49%). 
17  Lukas Hakelberg published the findings of an event history analysis, which show that the massive spread of 
local climate strategies is promoted by transnational municipal networks, which successfully deploy strate-
gies for governance by diffusion. He points to the fact that their impact on that spread is exceeding that of 
most alternative explanatory factors cited in the literature. He concludes that such transnational networks 
can be expected to play a decisive role in a climate governance system that is becoming increasingly frag-
mented, polycentric, and transnational (Hakelberg 2014). 
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local authorities in energy transition, “Energy Cities”, was founded in 1990 and represents 
more than 1,000 towns and cities in 30 countries. All of these initiatives across the Europe-
an Union are currently creating a new energy paradigm towards a low-carbon society, driv-
en by the motivation to exploit untapped potentials for the deployment of renewable en-
ergy and energy efficiency at the local level.  
Although the European Commission and national governments have brought attention to 
the local level’s potential to develop innovative approaches in climate and energy, the 
motives of the actors at the de-central level to engage in the low-carbon-transition are 
completely neglected within the macro-economic and short-term cost-efficiency perspec-
tive, which underlies the Commission’s choice of the single target approach. In fact, it is 
the additional benefits for the communities’ development -in terms of jobs, security of 
supply, health and environment impacts, citizen’s engagement in community issues and 
their wish to control energy supplies - which makes them active. However, for the Europe-
an Commission these additional benefits, which were also pronounced in the Commission’s 
staff impact assessment, seemingly fall under suspicion for being driven by measures 
which, “[…] have not always ensured market integration, cost-efficiency and undistorted 
competition“(European Commission 2014b: 5, see above).  
A pure perspective on cost-efficiency, repeatedly put forward by Europe’s Energy Commis-
sioner Günther Oettinger, implies that market forces in the integrated electricity market 
would guarantee the most cost-efficient allocation of RES facilities across Europe. Precise-
ly these market forces will spur a spatial allocation of facilities according to best available 
returns due to weather and geographical conditions. This perspective neglects that not the 
greatest return motivates bottom-up initiatives of communities and energy cooperatives. 
They do not want to invest somewhere in Europe. Instead, the additional benefits for their 
community’s development motivate their investment in RES-facilities and efficiency 
measures in their “backyard”. Moreover, relying solely on market forces to determine an 
efficient spatial allocation of facilities implies a perception of these bottom-up activities 
as strange within the energy system – as a kind of “infiltration”18 in the strategic action 
field of the established actors, the big energy utilities19.  
However, the dispute over additional benefits reveals the subnational level activities and 
actors as relevant potential partners for Germany in shaping the European energy and cli-
mate policy framework. The German government, as well as the German Bundeslaender, 
argue with the additional benefits as well. They focus on the value added by the develop-
ment and deployment of RES as well as by increased efficiency measures and the national 
18  A term which apparently has been used by the Europe’s energy commissioner Oettinger in a meeting with 
fellow Christian Democrats with regard to „citizens [that] have ‘infiltrated‘ the German power sector with 
their grassroot Energiewende“ (quoted in Morris 2014). 
19  For a recent overview of strategies of the incumbent actors in the strategic action field of energy policy in 
Germany, please see the published first results of a study by Kungl 2014. 
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security of supply by the greater reliance on indigenous energy source. Thus, a European-
wide perspective on such a cost-efficient allocation of RES-facilities - as in the Commis-
sion’s new strategic approach to market compatible climate and energy policy measures - 
cannot also be in the interest of an array of German actors at different policy and adminis-
trative levels, as they do not offer the most competitive weather and geographical condi-
tions among the European regions.  
Thus, from the German perspective, it would be appropriate to strategically utilize this 
bottom-up and horizontal mode of convergence complementarily to multilateral negotia-
tions at supranational level and to assist transnational actor networks of municipalities and 
regions in order to stimulate a horizontal diffusion of attitudes, ideas and good practices 
for a low carbon energy system transformation.  
3.2 A hasty government’s adaptation to supranational pressure: the remaining gov-
ernance options regarding instrument choice for RES support 
As described above, the EC’s new state-aid guidelines specify design features of a national 
support scheme for renewables so that they meet the compatibility requirements of these 
guidelines. As a reminder, this will only be the case if the aid is granted as a premium in 
addition to the market price, while the level of granted aid must be determined by a com-
petitive bidding process. Such volume-based auction or tender systems fundamentally dif-
fer from the scheme that Germany had applied over the years. Germany’s scheme was a 
price-based support scheme, with administratively fixed prices for RES according to their 
technological maturity.  
Theoretically, there would have been two alternative modes for the German government’s 
response to this supranational pressure for such a fundamental instrumental shift: to pro-
voke friction with the EC and to commence a proceeding to the ECJ on the one hand, or to 
adapt to the external pressure on the other. The government decided to pursue the latter.  
It would, however, be a mistake to attribute this instrumental shift only to supranational 
pressure. Indeed, there has been a long-lasting domestic debate on the need to introduce 
cost- and volume controlling elements into the German scheme. Nevertheless, the pending 
infringement procedure and the subsequent standstill requirement (see above) led to a 
very hasty reform agenda and a rejectionist stance by the government on any stakeholder 
discussion over alternatives which might be in conflict with the Commission’s state aid 
rules.20 
20 In a letter from mid-May 2014 Minister Gabriel urged the parliamentary groups to hurry in formulating any 
proposal for amendment to the Government’s draft reform of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) to the first 
week of June. This would be necessary in order to ensure a timely examination of the legal text by the Eu-
ropean Commission by the end of June. The government’s schedule would foresee an adoption of the new 
EEG law in the Bundestag on June 26; on August 1 the new act should come into force. He argued that this 
schedule determined whether the law would be ready on time to grant the EEG surcharge exemptions for 
industrial companies due to the pending EU state aid proceedings. Otherwise, he clearly states, “the elec-
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The reform of the Renewable Energy Act was adopted by the parliament on June 27, 2014. 
Concerning the design of the future support scheme, the reform fully adapts to the norms 
defined by EC’s state aid guidelines; direct marketing will be mandatory by 2016. By 2017, 
the level of the market premium will be determined by a competitive price building mech-
anism via auctions. However, thus far no detailed design features of the auction mecha-
nism are specified in the law.  
A careful instrument design by including normative elements 
Comparative studies clearly suggest that the potentials and risks of auctioning – which is 
supported by little empirical evidence in Europe thus far – depend on the specific design of 
the instrument (ecofys 2014, IZES 2014). It is not the aim of this study to discuss this de-
sign in detail. However, during the consultation process of the draft of the Renewable En-
ergy Act, many stakeholders raised concerns against this mechanism, which is perceived to 
fundamentally change the framework conditions for those new actors in the energy field, 
who had driven the rapid expansion of RES in Germany. 
At this juncture, it is necessary to briefly shed light on the most striking phenomenon of 
the German energy transition process. It is characterized by the rise of new energy actors, 
precisely de-centrally organized citizen’s energy co-operations investing with or without 
local authorities’ involvement in RES-facilities in their region. According to a recent mar-
ket analysis in 2012, citizen engagement counts for 47 % of total installed capacity in RES, 
in particular photovoltaic and onshore-wind capacity (trend:research and Leuphana Univer-
sität Lüneburg 2013: 42 pp). Thus, according to this ownership-type-based analysis, citi-
zens and cooperatives have the largest share, while the energy utilities’ share accounts for 
only 12 % of the new installed RES-capacity (ibid.). The previous FIT-scheme and the guar-
anteed feed-in-priority for renewable electricity into the grid functioned as a shelter for 
renewable electricity producers to grow up in a protected niche. However, the returns in 
this niche-segment of the electricity market were apparently not high enough for the tra-
ditional energy utilities to invest (see Morris 2014, Kungl 2014). New actors were mobi-
lized, and their investments in RES were not only motivated by the greatest available re-
turn, but also by the additional benefits described in the previous chapter. Thus, it was 
not until the market effect of the rapid growth of RES electricity became significant in 
tricity-intensive companies would have to pay the full EEG apportionment from 1 January 2015”(own trans-
lation, the author has a copy of this letter). In a similar vein, Rainer Baake, state secretary in the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, argued in an e-mailed letter to the representatives of the German 
Länder (states), why he was forced to reject almost all of the 70 proposals for amendments: “Many of the 
applications for amendments, however, lead to risks for notification because they deviate from the EC state 
aid guidelines” (own translation, the author has a copy of the letter).  
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terms of low wholesale prices, that the traditional energy actors changed their strategy – 
in particular their communication with regard to renewable energies (Kungl 2014: 25). In-
stead of criticizing RES as such, they introduced another problem framing to the debate 
and started “criticizing the difficulty of integrating them into the market, to the extent of 
claiming that they would pose a serious threat for the security of supply” (ibid.).  
This problem framing of the need for market integration of renewable energies became 
the dominant framing in political debates – not only at the European level but also at the 
domestic level in Germany.21 Mandatory direct marketing, combined with a competitive 
auction scheme to determine the price for the market premium, is perceived by both the 
EC and the German government as the appropriate solution for this problem framing.  
However, this instrumental shift is perceived by many stakeholders as a serious threat for a 
further engagement of those new actors who had driven the transition thus far. From the 
stakeholder’s consultation regarding the redesign of the EEG22 and studies on the perfor-
mance of different design options for RES support schemes (ecofys 2014, IZES 2014, AEE 
2014) one can derive the following risks, which are assumed to affect the actor constella-
tion in the energy field: 
 Higher transaction cost for investors for taking part in auctioning 
 Higher risks for investors 
 Exclusion of smaller players - due to limited affordability of costs/risks for coopera-
tives and private actors  
 Threat for the process of de-centralization of the energy system through spatial 
concentration of generation facilities 
 Exclusion of less mature RES-technologies 
Furthermore, due to the practical experiences of other countries, the effectiveness in 
terms of low rates of project-implementation and the ostensibly cost-minimizing effect of 
auction schemes is also in question (ecofys 2014, IZES 2014).  
This is not the place to discuss these risks in detail; however, they must be seriously taken 
into account when conceptualizing the precise design features of the instrument in Ger-
many. As stakeholders are aware, that these design features – which so far are unspecified 
21  Various scientists have pointed to the shortcoming of this problem framing. They distinguish between the 
market integration and system integration of RES. They also make the point that, due to the volatile nature 
of RES, they will never fit with the current market design based on marginal cost. The scientists made sev-
eral proposals for an adequate adaptation of the market design to be compatible with an increased share of 
volatile renewable energy sources (see for example Hauser and Zipp 2013, IZES et al. 2013). 
22  The stakeholder’s written statements are published at the Web-page oft the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy: http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Erneuerbare-Energien/EEG-
Reform/stellungnahmen-zweite-runde.html . 
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– crucially matter. The scientific and interest groups’ struggle over the issue has only just 
begun.  
In order to maintain public acceptance, maintain the citizens’ and regional actors’ en-
gagement, and thus maintain the chances for a energy transition based on de-centralized 
energy system architecture, it is necessary to optimize the instrument’s design with regard 
to its effectiveness, efficiency as well as to a symmetric distribution or reduction of both 
transaction costs and investment risks. Learning lessons from abroad might be the best 
available governance option at the moment, as practical experiences provide insights how 
to minimize the perceived risks. There are a few experiences available, for example that 
of Denmark, which demonstrate how to further ensure new actors’ and local communities’ 
engagement by introducing: location-specific tenders; the provision of information on local 
resource conditions before the submission of a tender, which allows more equal condition 
to all potential bidders; and by introducing participatory elements with a mandatory local 
resident participation in the projects (ecofys 2014: 61 pp.). Thus, such provisions introduce 
normative elements into a market design, which are underpinned by strategic policy deci-
sions of the Danish government about how to transform the energy system. 
The German government has publicly declared it will consider the contribution of the new 
actors to the previous success story of RES in Germany and not threaten the subnational 
efforts towards a low-carbon energy transition. It will be judged on this declaration by the 
future public acceptance of the energy transition, which so far has formed the crucial 
backbone of the entire undertaking. Whether this statement is more than mere lip service 
depends on the political will of the government to include such normative considerations 
into the design of the future national auction scheme. 
4 Conclusion 
The European Energy and Climate policy is at a crossroad. Indeed, so is the German energy 
transition process. As the country with the most ambitious approach to transforming a con-
ventional-fuel-based energy system into a system based on renewable energy sources, 
Germany’s domestic developments are of global importance. Stakeholders all over the 
world will recognize domestic policy shifts of such a fundamental dimension, especially 
their impact on further progress.  
The paper has argued that the shift at the domestic level cannot merely be traced back to 
domestic struggles over meanings, policy goals and instrument choices. In fact, there was a 
clear need to adapt the EEG to the new requirements imposed by the increasing share of 
RES in electricity consumption and to introduce certain elements of cost and volume con-
trol into the scheme.  
However, a prominent push for this kind of instrumental shift in the support scheme for 
RES came from the supranational level. The EC framed both the need for changes in the 
Community’s target architecture as well as the necessity of adjusting national schemes to 
internal market requirements in a manner that indicates a confluence with the interests of 
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powerful incumbent actors in the energy system. Additionally, the EC, as the supranational 
actor, creatively changed the rules of the game in an on-going European governance di-
lemma by using its discretionary power in the Union’s competition law to force a shift in in 
instrument choices of national RES support schemes.  
A transition towards a low-carbon society will be a process, one which is characterized by 
competing values, perceptions and goals of different actors, and by uncertainty and an 
ambiguity of scientific recommendations. However, founding political decisions on sustain-
able energy transition issues on one ideological component - that of single market func-
tioning – will not be sufficient to achieve the other societal objectives, which so far have 
motivated and legitimized respective undertakings at several levels by numerous actors.  
From the author’s political science perspective, it will not be enough for EU Member States 
to claim their constitutional right to nationally decide on national energy matters. It will 
equally be insufficient to argue for the necessity of domestic solutions, which are more 
adaptive to the various national circumstances. Even a reference to regulatory competition 
between de-central policy jurisdictions to stimulate policy innovation might not be suffi-
cient to change the dominant prism through which supranational actors currently look at 
energy transition matters.  
Instead, to provide the necessary evidence for other founding principles of energy-
policymaking beyond short-term cost-efficiency concerns, governmental actors should rely 
much more on the power from the bottom than they have in the past. At the subnational 
level, another paradigm of a low-carbon society is emerging. This alternate paradigm is 
gaining ideational power as well as economic relevance across societies in Europe. 
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